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1 Introduction
In The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison, Professor Cornelia Woll
asks a question of fundamental importance: “What was the nature of power
finance wielded over the fate of the economy and the crisis management in
2008, which affected the lives of so many?”1 To measure the effective power
that the financial industry wielded during the crisis, Woll compares the terms of
bailout packages that governments adopted in six countries in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis. She contends that financial institutions were more likely
to receive larger amounts of public support, and to make minimal contributions to
rescue plans, in nations where the financial industry’s influence satisfied three
important factors.
The first two factors relate to the effective political power of the financial
industry. Thus, Woll finds that the terms of public bailouts were most advantageous
to the financial industry in nations where the industry held the highest levels of
structural power and productive power. The third factor is whether the financial
industry had the ability to adopt a position of “collective inaction” and, therefore, to
reject government calls for industry contributions to help resolve the financial crisis.2
The first two factors inWoll’s analysis – structural and productive power – have
been widely studied and documented in popular and academic literature. Structural
power arises from the economy’s dependence on the financial industry for its health
and strength.3 Productive power is created when the financial industry exploits its
structural influence to promote public policies that favor the industry.4
1 Cornelia Woll, The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison 3–4 (2014).
2 Id. at 4–7.
3 Id. at 46–50.
4 Id. at 50–56.
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The third prong of Woll’s thesis – the power of “collective inaction” – is a
new concept that distinguishes Woll’s analysis of financial power from previous
studies. Woll persuasively argues that the financial industry’s ability to engage
in collective inaction was a crucial factor that forced governments to adopt
bailout measures that favored the financial sector.5 Collective inaction occurred
when the financial industry refused to act collectively and did not make sig-
nificant contributions toward the cost of rescuing troubled financial institutions.
By successfully pursuing a strategy of collective inaction, the financial industry
forced the government to use public funds to pay for rescuing failing banks.6
Conversely, in countries where the banking sector felt obliged to cooperate with
the government and contribute to rescue programs, governments were able to
engage in “intervention that did not weigh heavily on the public budget.”7
Woll illustrates the power of collective inaction in three comparative case
studies. Each of Woll’s case studies considers a pair of countries in which the
financial sector had similar characteristics and wielded similar levels of structural
and productive power. Woll compares the United States and the United Kingdom
(two liberal, market-based economies), France and Germany (two examples of bank-
based economies with large universal banks), and Ireland and Denmark (two small,
open economies).8 Despite similar economies and financial sectors, the government
responseswithin each set of paired countries were quite different. In some countries,
government agencies felt obliged to rescue the financial sector by committing vast
amounts of public funds. Other governments emerged as successful crisis managers
and were able to force the financial industry to make significant contributions
toward the costs of rescue programs. In some countries, the financial industry was
obliged to comply with onerous new regulations and experienced the crisis as “the
end of an era, which effectively ended the world they had once known.”9 In other
countries, the financial sector experienced the crisis as an “unpleasant, yet short-
lived” crisis, which did not “change their fundamental advantages.”10
Woll demonstrates that an important distinguishing factor in each of her
paired case studies was the financial sector’s ability or inability to refuse to
cooperate with the government in financing bailouts. Financial institutions were
most powerful in those countries where they succeeded in avoiding a collective
response and forced national policymakers to rescue banks with public funds.
5 Id. at 6.
6 Id. at 7.
7 Id. at 138.
8 However, unlike Ireland, Denmark is not part of EMU.
9 Woll, supra note 1, at 60.
10 Id.
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In order to prevent bailouts that rely primarily on public resources during the
next crisis, Woll warns that policymakers must understand the conditions under
which the financial industry can successfully avoid an obligation to act collec-
tively. In that regard, she argues that a crucial factor in determining whether the
financial industry can refuse to act collectively is whether the largest financial
institutions are relatively strong and therefore do not need to call on the govern-
ment for public support. As indicated below, we agree that the health of leading
financial institutions is a relevant consideration. However, we believe that
Professor Woll has understated the central importance of the financial industry’s
political clout in defining the industry’s ability to resist appeals for collective
rescue programs. As discussed below, her case studies strongly indicate that the
financial industry’s power of collective inaction is likely to be greatest when the
industry as a whole wields a very high level of political influence.
2 Structural power: How the economy’s
dependence on the financial sector increases
the financial industry’s influence
Woll borrows Michael Barnett’s and Raymond Duvall’s definition of power as
“the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape
their capacity to control their fate.”11 During the last financial crisis, the finan-
cial industry attempted to use its structural power to secure government bailout
programs that favored the industry by drawing primarily on public funds rather
than industry contributions. Thus, the first key component of finance power is
the structural power that financial institutions derive from their specific role in
the economy, including the degree to which the economy’s overall performance
depends on the financial industry.12
Analysis of the structural dynamic between the leading business sectors and
the state has a longstanding tradition in academic studies. As scholars have
shown, business sectors that play leading roles in a capitalist economy wield
structural power because the government desires to achieve economic growth
11 Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59 Int’l Org. 39, 45 (2005).
12 Woll, supra note 1, at 46–50; see also Pepper D. Culpepper & Raphael Reinke, Structural Power
and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States, 42 Politics & Society 427, 431, 441
(2014), available at http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/events/Pepper-30oct2014.pdf (describing
“structural power” as a power that “flows from the economic position of the firm in an economy,”
which provides “a resource on which banks draw deliberately in bargaining with the government”).
8 K. M. Barnes and A. E. Wilmarth
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and is therefore inclined to agree to demands made by those business sectors.13
In a country with a large financial sector, the financial industry is likely to enjoy
a high degree of structural power. The dependence of the economy on financial
intermediaries for investment and credit, combined with the threat that large
financial institutions may shift their operations outside of a country if its policies
are unfavorable, will provide the financial industry with significant influence
over other sectors of the economy and the government.14
The particular relationships among banks, other providers of financial ser-
vices, business firms, and the government are important in defining the nature
of structural power.15 In bank-based economies, governments depend primarily
on the ability of banks to provide credit to the real economy. In market-based
economies, governments depend on both banks and the capital markets to
promote economic growth and, therefore, are primarily concerned with main-
taining financial market stability. This distinction implies that governments in
market-based systems will focus on the welfare of the largest financial institu-
tions whose failure would be likely to undermine financial stability.16
The size, scope and power of “too big to fail” banks have increased as
financial products and markets have become more complex and as the financial
sector has grown larger in many developed economies. Even so, as indicated
above, the relationship between the financial sector and the state is likely to
differ based on the particular type of financial system that is found in each
country. Governments in bank-based economies will be strongly inclined to
rescue banks in order to save the economy, while governments in market-
based economies will be likely to save the most important banking or nonbank-
ing financial institutions in order to stabilize their financial markets.17
A second factor that determines the structural power of the financial indus-
try is the size of its activities in relation to the economy of a country.18 In small
13 Fred Block, The Ruling Class Does Not Rule, 7 Socialist Revolution 6, 6–28 (1977); Charles E.
Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. Pol. 323 (1982).
14 Block, supra not 13; Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy, 36
European J. Pol. Res., no. 1, 1999, at 26; Adam Przeworski & Michael Wallerstein, Structural
Dependence of the State on Capital, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 11, 11–29 (1988).
15 Woll, supra note 1, at 49.
16 Emiliano Grossman & Cornelia Woll, Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts
(Jan. 2012), at 4, available at http://cps.sagepub.com/content/47/4/574.
17 Woll, supra note 1, at 49.
18 David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, The Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in Europe
(University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2015/19, Europa Working Paper No.
2015/03, 2015), at 10, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2630555 (listing the relative
importance of bank credit to national financial systems as an important factor in determining
regulator’s preferences in implementing Basel III); Woll, supra note 1, at 50.
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countries with large banking industries, such as Ireland and Denmark, govern-
ments will place a very high priority on avoiding serious potential harm to the
financial sector.19 The growth of structural power can also be seen in larger
countries with highly developed financial markets, such as the United States.
The size, economic significance, and political influence of America’s financial
sector have expanded enormously over the past thirty years, a phenomenon that
some analysts have described as the “financialization” of the U.S. economy.20
Between 1978 and 2007, the U.S. financial sector grew from 3.5% to 5.9% of the
economy, measured by its contribution to gross domestic product (GDP).21
The structural power of the financial industry can be high in both bank-
based and market-based economies, as shown in Woll’s case studies. Wall Street
and the City of London are the two most important global financial centers, and
the United States and the United Kingdom have highly developed capital mar-
kets that are actively supported by government policy. Finance has increasingly
assumed a central role within both nations’ economic growth strategies.22 In
terms of the financial industry’s structural power, France and Germany are also
quite similar, with a strong tradition of bank-based finance but with a growing
role for capital market activities. Because the largest French and German banks
are universal banks, they wield a high degree of power and influence due to
their combination of banking and capital markets services. The increasing
reliance of the French and German economies on their financial sectors, and
the desire of both governments to create major financial centers in continental
Europe, have enhanced the structural power of the financial industry in both
France and Germany.23
The structural power of finance was also very high in both Ireland and
Denmark, because both countries experienced a rapid expansion of their finan-
cial industries relative to the size of their economies during the period leading
up to the financial crisis. Both governments encouraged financial innovation
19 Woll, supra note 1, at 50.
20 Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work
Ahead 6 (2013); Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the
Next Financial Meltdown 59 (2010); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why
Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev 1283, 1406–07 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327872 (stating that the “far-reaching deregulation of the U.S. finan-
cial services industry after 1980 and the resulting proliferation of new financial activities and
products promoted rapid growth in the industry’s size, profitability and compensation.”).
21 Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015, October 29). Gross Domestic Product, Expanded Detail,
Table 1.5.5, available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp.
22 Woll, supra note 1, at 83–85.
23 Id. at 113–15.
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and gave top priority to further development of the financial sector.24 Despite all
these similarities, the six nations approached bailouts very differently. Woll
therefore concludes that it is not sufficient to understand the structural power
that the financial industry wields in a particular country. We must also under-
stand how the financial industry uses its structural power to secure favorable
public policies. This leads her to a consideration of productive power.
3 Productive power: How the financial industry
exploits its privileged position within the
economy to secure favorable treatment
The theory of productive power also has a strong academic pedigree. First devel-
oped by Foucault through his analysis of political authority,25 the concept of
productive power explains how citizens decide to accept the political framework
through which they are governed.26 After showing that the financial sector holds a
privileged position within many developed countries, Woll turns the theory of
productive power away from its initial focus on citizens to study how governments
themselves are influenced through social relations between government officials
and industry representatives.27 She emphasizes the importance of closely inter-
twined networks linking public officials and executives from the financial sector.
She further explains how those networks can produce and maintain not just a
“light touch” approach toward regulating finance,28 but also a general positive
ideology that promotes the welfare of finance.29 Woll contends – correctly, in our
view – that this regulatory mindset in favor of finance and light-touch regulation
is a product of (i) shared social experiences between government officials and
24 Id. at 140–43.
25 See generally Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999);
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977 (Colin
Gordon eds., 1980); Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (1999).
26 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978
(Michel Senellart eds., Graham Burchell trans., 2004).
27 Woll, supra note 1, at 51.
28 Id. at 50–56.
29 Id.; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 89, 104; Blinder, supra note 20, at 56;
Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Trade in
Dollars, Foreign Affairs, May-June 1998, at 7–12 (describing how the ideology of free markets in
the United States “lulled many economists and policymakers into complacency about the
pitfalls that certain markets inherently pose,” while revolving doors placed representatives of
Wall Street into influential positions in Washington).
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financial representatives, (ii) biases resulting from regulatory officials’ belief in the
presumptively superior expertise of financial industry insiders, and (iii) the frag-
mentation in many countries of financial regulation among multiple agencies,
resulting in competing regulatory approaches and an opportunity for financial
institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage.30
3.1 Shared social and professional experiences between
policymakers and industry insiders promote regulatory
capture
Financial industry representatives in each of the six countries studied by Woll
built close social networks with government officials in order to persuade
regulators to adopt policies that were consistent with the industry’s preferences.
For example, according to Simon Johnson and James Kwak, the financial indus-
try in the United States built an elite network between Wall Street and
Washington and used the resulting “cultural capital”31 to promote a “mindset”
that “what was good for Wall Street was good for America.”32 The term “reg-
ulatory capture”33 does not necessarily imply that financial regulators are cor-
rupt in the sense of accepting bribes, or that their actions are consciously
motivated by selfish personal interests. Instead, regulatory capture typically
occurs when regulators share the worldview and the preferences of the industry
they supervise, and when regulators believe that they are acting in the public
interest by supporting the industry.34
One of the authors of this review (Wilmarth) has similarly attributed much of
the financial sector’s political clout to the extensive professional and social
contacts that take place between senior government officials and top executives
in the financial industry. Financial regulators identify with the views and
experiences of industry leaders because both groups have similar educational
and professional backgrounds and engage in policy discussions in numerous
venues.35 Likewise, Andrew Baker concludes that “cognitive capture” results
30 Woll, supra note 1, at 50–56.
31 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 90.
32 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 10; see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson,Winner-Take-
All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer – and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class
221–30, 247–50 (2011).
33 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 93.
34 Id. at 93.
35 Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1417–18; see also Cristie L. Ford, Macro- and Micro-Level Effects
on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 589, 614–15 (2011).
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from similar training and a shared belief in the same policy goals, all of which
contribute significantly to the financial industry’s influence.36
Johnson, Kwak, and Wilmarth argue that the “revolving door” encourages
regulatory capture by promoting a continuous interchange of senior personnel
between elite government posts and executive positions within large financial
institutions and their professional service providers.37 Woll emphasizes that the
most important impact of the revolving door is the production of “worldviews,
meanings, and interpretations that develop from shared experiences,” so that
government policymakers sincerely believe that they are serving the greater
good by adopting policies favored by the financial industry.38
3.2 The highly technical nature of modern finance and the
insulation of policymaking from public accountability
encourage regulators to adopt pro-industry views
Woll also cites the “technicality” of finance and the relative insulation of
financial regulatory policy from public accountability as contributing factors to
the productive power of the financial industry.39 In specialized, relatively
obscure areas where the general public has little knowledge or interest, policy-
makers are likely to feel most comfortable in basing their decisions on private
discussions with industry representatives.40 Michael Moran has referred to this
phenomenon as the “wink-and-nod” method of governance, in his analysis of
financial regulation in the United Kingdom.41 Similarly, Pepper Culpepper has
argued that business influence is much greater in “quiet politics,” where issues
are negotiated in secret without much public attention.42
The highly technical and complex nature of “innovative” financial products
has encouraged the belief that regulators should give great deference to industry
expertise when regulatory policies are developed. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig
argue that financial industry representatives deliberately use the “mystique” of
36 Andrew Baker, Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics, and
Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance, 86 Int’l Aff. 647, 647–63 (2010).
37 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 92–104; Wilmarth at 1407–17.
38 Woll, supra note 1, at 51.
39 Ford, supra note 35, at 614–15 (stating that regulators “operate within a relatively narrow,
insulated and expertise-based” field of work that they share with “sophisticated repeat players”
in the financial industry); Woll, supra note 1, at 52–53.
40 Woll, supra note 1, at 52.
41 Michael Moran, The Politics of Banking: The Strange Case of Competition and Credit Control (1984).
42 PepperCulpepper,Quiet Politics andBusiness Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (2011).
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modern finance to promote light-touch regulatory approaches. “Anyone who
questions the mystique and the claims that are made is at risk of being declared
incompetent to participate in the discussion,” they argue. “The specialists’ façade
of competence and confidence is too intimidating. Even people who know better
fail to speak up.”43 Similarly, Wilmarth observes that the perceived “socioeco-
nomic and intellectual superiority of Wall Street insiders provide further induce-
ments for regulators to accept the financial industry’s viewpoints.”44
3.3 Fragmentation of financial regulation leads
to regulatory arbitrage
The fragmentation of financial regulation frequently creates regulatory competi-
tion among government agencies that supervise different types of financial
products, such as those generated by retail, commercial, and investment bank-
ing services. The evolution of different regulatory arrangements for various types
of financial institutions can create fragmented and overlapping networks. In
addition, financial institutions can increase their leverage over policymaking if
they are allowed to choose their regulators for different activities. Thus, regula-
tory fragmentation and competition can lead to regulatory arbitrage that weak-
ens governmental control.45
Wilmarth points to regulatory arbitrage in the 1990s and 2000s as a source
of financial sector influence in the United States. He states that the industry
“actively promoted” regulatory competition and “pushed agencies to adopt
policies that would please their existing constituents and attract new ones.”
The resulting regulatory arbitrage “undermined the ability and willingness of
regulators to apply rigorous supervisory policies.”46 A similar regulatory com-
petition for large financial institutions took place on an international level,
especially between New York and London, with each financial center (and
43 Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and
What to Do About It 2 (2013); accord Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 109 (“people who didn’t
subscribe to [the advantages of financial innovation] could be written off as ignoramuses who
failed to understand the elegance of modern finance.”).
44 Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1420; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 92–94 (“[A]s
the world of finance became more complicated and more central to the economy, the federal
government became more dependent on people with modern financial expertise – which meant
people from the big banks and from their most cutting-edge businesses.”).
45 Woll, supra note 1, at 56.
46 Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1390; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 96 (noting that
the desire for larger regulatory fees among U.S. banking agencies created incentives for a “race to
the bottom,” in which agencies attracted “customers” by offering lax regulatory enforcement).
14 K. M. Barnes and A. E. Wilmarth
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their respective national governments) pressuring their regulators to adopt
industry-friendly, light-touch policies.47
3.4 Political contributions and lobbying increase
the financial industry’s influence
Woll acknowledges the long line of academic studies focusing on financial
institutions and their interactions with governments through lobbying activ-
ities.48 However, she criticizes as superficial the assumption that political deci-
sions are a direct outcome of lobbying resources: “[h]ow these resources are
used and when they matter seems to depend on other features that go beyond
the pure contacts between the industry and public authorities.”49
It is true that we cannot point solely to lobbying resources as the source of
all financial sector influence. However, lobbying activities, together with poli-
tical contributions, appear to contribute significantly to the financial industry’s
political clout. As Wilmarth has pointed out, (1) the financial sector in the United
States has spent huge sums on political contributions and lobbying, (2) the
financial sector’s political clout increased as commercial banks joined forces
with securities firms and insurance companies to create a unified industry
perspective, and (3) the industry received excellent returns from the political
investments it made during the period leading up to the financial crisis. Between
1994 and 2007, “the financial industry achieved a series of landmark legislative
victories and also defeated numerous bills that tried to impose tighter con-
straints on subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending.”50
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff study concluded that lobbying
by the financial industry between 1999 and 2006 significantly improved the
likelihood of passage for bills favored by the industry and also increased the
probability of defeat for bills opposed by the industry.51 Another study by
Benjamin Blau and others found that politically influential banks received
significantly larger amounts of TARP assistance, compared with banks that
47 Admati & Hellwig, supra note 43, at 9–10, 96, 192–95, 199; Darius Wojcik, The Dark Side of
NY-LON: Financial Centres and the Global Financial Crisis (University of Oxford Employment,
Work and Finance Working Paper No. 11–12, July 20, 2011), at 7, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1890644; Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1393–98.
48 Woll, supra note 1, at 4.
49 Id. at 6.
50 Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1359–64.
51 Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street 4, 15–18
(IMF Working Paper, June 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915164.
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were not actively involved in politics. For every dollar that financial institutions
spent on lobbying during the five years prior to TARP, the same firms received
about $500 of additional TARP support.52 Johnson and Kwak also point to the
1990s and 2000s as a period of rapidly increasing political contributions and
lobbying by the financial sector that led to major changes in laws and regula-
tions that favored the industry.53 Thus, there appears to be a strong connection
between the industry’s deployment of political contributions and lobbying
resources and the industry’s productive power – i.e., its success in achieving
favorable policy outcomes.
3.5 Woll’s case studies demonstrate the importance
of productive power
Woll concludes that the financial industry wielded a high degree of productive
power in the United States, the United Kingdom and Ireland, where the regula-
tory approach “enshrines a low level of constraint, high risk-taking, and fragility
of financial institutions as a positive contribution to the economy.”54 High
productive power in all three nations can be seen in the adoption of light-
touch financial regulatory regimes as well as close relationships among finan-
cial, political and regulatory elites.55
Woll contends that the financial sector’s productive power was less perva-
sive in Denmark and Germany and least significant in France.56 France and
52 Benjamin M. Blau, Tyler J. Brough, & Diana W. Thomas, Corporate Lobbying, Political
Connections, and the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program 4, 22 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878653.
53 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 90–92 (reporting that campaign contributions from the
financial sector, including finance, insurance, and real estate, quadrupled from $61 million in
1990 to $260 million in 2006, while contributions from the securities and investment industry
sextupled from $12 million to $72 million over the same span of time); see also Wilmarth, supra
note 20, at 1363 (Between 1990 and 2012, the financial sector spent more than $3.3 billion on
political campaigns and $5.3 billion on lobbying between 1998 and 2012 and ranked third
among all industry sectors in lobbying outlays. The financial industry accounted for 15% of
lobbying expenditures by all industry sectors between 1999 and 2006).
54 Woll, supra note 1, at 56; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 93 (“[A]s banking
insiders gain power and influence in Washington, the positions they held – that complex
financial products, free financial markets, and large, sophisticated financial institutions were
good for America – became orthodoxy in the United States.”).
55 Woll, supra note 1, at 83–85.
56 Id. at 56.
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Germany both have “market-shaping”57 approaches to financial regulation;
however, France’s regulatory framework was relatively stricter and more cen-
tralized.58 Denmark had a particularly stringent regulatory structure with several
crisis-related policy instruments that were adopted following the Scandinavian
financial crisis of the early 1990s.59
Woll’s cases studies demonstrate that productive power is not simply the
result of elite social networks that link government officials with industry
insiders. For example, the French banking system has been referred to as a
“cartel-like structure”60 and an “informal consortium,”61 due to the highly
concentrated nature of the French banking industry as well as common
education and work experiences shared by heads of French banks and
government officials. Even so, Woll considers the financial sector of France
to wield the least amount of productive power because France has a long
tradition of government intervention (e.g., state ownership of banks was
common until the 1990s) and the government has maintained strong over-
sight of the principal activities of the financial industry.62 The French experi-
ence suggests that tight business-government relations could be less effective
in manipulating governmental policies if proper regulatory restraints are
established and enforced.
Overall, Woll’s case studies demonstrate that the resources of the financial
industry and the links that industry insiders maintain with policymakers are
substantial everywhere. However, productive power is not sufficient by itself to
explain the variations in bailout policies that existed among the six countries
included in Woll’s case studies. Those significant differences in bailout policies
caused Woll to examine how financial industry insiders and government officials
actually dealt with each other during the 2008 financial crisis. After studying
57 Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the European
Union, 17 New Pol. Econ. 515, 518–22 (2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.
2012.622360 (comparing a “market-shaping” approach to financial regulation, which prioritizes
financial stability and consumer protection through rule-based regulation, to a “market-mak-
ing” approach, which emphasizes the objectives of competition and market efficiency through
light-touch regulation and private sector governance).
58 Woll, supra note 1, at 115.
59 Grossman & Woll, supra note 16, at 11.
60 Woll, supra note 1, at 126.
61 Nicolas Jabko & Elsa Massoc, French Capitalism under Stress: How Nicolas Sarkozy Rescued
the Banks, 19 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 562, 562–85 (2012).
62 Woll, supra note 1, at 112–15; see also Quaglia, supra note 57, at 520–22 (stating that France
led the “market-shaping coalition” in the EU, which was characterized by “prescriptive, rule-
based regulation” and a “strong steering action from the public authorities”).
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those interactions, Woll focused her attention on the power of collective inaction
displayed by the financial industry in four out of her six case studies.63
4 The power of inaction: Forcing the government
to pick up the pieces
The third element of Woll’s thesis, and the most innovative, analyzes the con-
ditions under which the financial industry will or will not act collectively to save
itself in times of crisis. During the financial crisis, governments everywhere tried
to encourage collective participation by the financial sector in support of official
rescue programs. In four of the six countries studied by Woll, the financial
industry refused to participate in rescue programs and forced the government
to use public funds to prevent the collapse of the financial system.64 Collective
inaction was the preferred strategy for the financial industry because that
strategy shielded financial institutions from the need to contribute their own
funds to support government rescue programs. However, collective inaction was
a successful strategy only in those countries where the financial industry had
sufficient strength to withstand the government’s pressure.65
4.1 When is collective inaction possible?
Woll derives her theory of collective inaction from Mancur Olson’s Logic of
Collective Action, which seeks to understand the conditions under which collec-
tive action will or will not occur. Olson demonstrates that small groups have an
advantage over large groups when it comes to organizing collective action. In
larger groups, even if everyone has an interest in supporting the public good,
self-interested individuals will decline to participate if their support cannot be
enforced, because they can free ride on efforts made by others. In contrast, the
incentive to free ride is weakened in small groups, where the lack of participa-
tion of individual members can be monitored and sanctioned.66
63 Id. at 61.
64 Id. at 170.
65 See Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control
111 (1963) (defining power in a similar manner as “the ability not to learn” from one’s mistakes
and to continue operating as usual, “insensitive to the present,” while forcing other people to
adapt to changed circumstances).
66 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(1965).
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The same type of conflict exists during banking crises. All banks recognize
financial stability as a public good, but helping to rescue failing competitors
will impose costs that banks prefer to avoid. When the failure of a financial
institution could impair the stability of the entire industry, banks will evaluate
whether their only realistic choice is to contribute to a collective rescue, or
whether they could be successful in forcing the government to pay for the
bailout with public funds. If financial institutions believe that the government
has adequate resources for the bailout and will not allow a systemically
important institution to fail, and if institutions also believe that they will not
incur serious sanctions for refusing to help, they will adopt a strategy of
collective inaction and “free ride” on a bailout financed entirely by public
funds.67 Woll examines the circumstances under which the financial industry
can be reasonably confident that the government will allow the industry to
decline to cooperate.
In Woll’s view, the likelihood of collective inaction within the financial
sector depends on relationships between the various types of financial institu-
tions that make up the industry as well as their individual motivations for
participating in a joint rescue program. She believes that the structural power
and productive power of the financial sectors are important factors, but she
views them as “only enabling conditions.”68 She contends that the pivotal
factor is the health of leading financial institutions: “If the most significant
ones or a significant portion of a country’s financial industry has no need for
government support, individually, this is likely to lead to collective inac-
tion.”69 Healthy institutions can refuse to cooperate because their survival is
not dependent on government support: “They may agree on the benefits of a
rescue scheme, in general, but can afford to gamble with the government in
the hope that the government will pay for the bailout rather than the
industry.”70
However, Woll’s emphasis on the health of leading financial institutions,
as the most important factor supporting a strategy of collective inaction,
does not fully answer some key questions. Why do strong leading financial
institutions conclude that they have a choice not to help in saving failing
67 Woll, supra note 1, at 58–59.
68 Id. at 172.
69 Id.; see also Culpepper & Reinke, supra note 12, at 440–41, 445–47 (claiming that leading
financial institutions in the United Kingdom and Germany shaped bailout packages in favor of
the industry by choosing not to participate in government rescue programs).
70 Woll, supra note 1, at 172.
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competitors and maintaining the stability of the entire economy? Why do
they not fear the potential adverse effects of refusing to cooperate in govern-
ment rescue plans, including the possibility of reprisals by government
agencies? These questions lead us back to a consideration of the industry’s
political clout (productive power). In our view, major financial institutions
do not need to fear the consequences of refusing to cooperate in countries
where (1) there has been a consistent public policy in favor of the financial
sector, or at least its most significant members, (2) the government has the
necessary resources to prevent the collapse of the financial system (i.e., the
financial system is not “too big to save”), and (3) the largest institutions can
therefore be reasonably confident that the government will use public funds
to save systemically important banks and will not punish other large banks
who refuse to help. A consistent pattern of favorable regulation, as demon-
strated by Johnson, Kwak, Adam Levitin,71 and Wilmarth, typically is pro-
duced by political contributions, lobbying activities, close industry-
government relations, and regulatory arbitrage. Woll’s thesis sheds impor-
tant light on the reasons why leading financial institutions would prefer a
strategy of collective inaction, and why those financial institutions might be
willing to adopt that strategy despite its potential risks. However, we believe
that Woll does not give sufficient attention to the crucial interaction between
the (i) cost-avoiding preferences of “too big to fail” institutions and (ii) their
ability to wield political influence that can shield them from tighter govern-
mental supervision and meaningful public sanctions.72
In sum, the authors of this review agree with Woll’s thesis to the extent
that the power of collective inaction is a very significant phenomenon that
helps to explain why some countries adopted bailout policies that were
highly favorable to the financial industry while other countries did not.
However we have reservations about Woll’s thesis to the extent that she
assigns less importance to the financial industry’s political clout as a factor
that determined whether the financial industry was successful in adopting a
strategy of collective inaction. To explore this area of disagreement, we turn
to Woll’s six case studies to evaluate the relative importance of political clout
and the health of leading financial institutions as factors that determined
whether the financial industry successfully adopted a strategy of collective
inaction.
71 Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A
Review Essay, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 2037–49 (2014).
72 Johnson & Kwak, supra note 20, at 90–92, 120–44; Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1288–95.
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4.2 Where and why did collective inaction occur?
4.2.1 The United States and the United Kingdom
The financial industries of the United States and the United Kingdom enjoyed
comparable structural and productive power, in large part because those nations
had long traditions of following market-oriented policies and had established
the two most important global financial centers. In both countries, the financial
industry refused to contribute to collective plans to rescue failing financial
institutions, despite the efforts of both governments. The unsuccessful attempt
by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve to organize a collective rescue of
Lehman Brothers was a notable example of the government’s failure to promote
collective action by systemically important institutions.73 Collective inaction by
the largest U.S. and U.K. financial institutions forced both governments to fund
costly bailouts, an outcome that supports Woll’s thesis. However, it is important
to examine the reasons why the financial industries in both nations were
successful in refusing to act collectively.
Woll focuses on the health of leading banks in both countries. She argues
that, in the United States, strong banks like JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo
were able to adopt a strategy of collective inaction because they did not need
government support. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, three major banks with
large international operations – HSBC, Barclays, and Standard Chartered –
adopted a similar strategy of collective inaction.74 However, questions remain
as to why the stronger U.S. and U.K. banks felt they could take the risk of
allowing other large financial institutions to fail. The answer appears to lie
partly in the banks’ confidence that the government could and would intervene
with public funds, and partly in the industry’s formidable productive power. In
other words, the strongest big banks were convinced that (1) the U.S. and U.K.
governments would rescue their weaker peers, allowing them to reap the indir-
ect benefits of government bailouts without paying the costs, and (2) they would
not incur any serious sanctions for their uncooperative behavior, in view of their
privileged positions as major sources of economic power and political influence.
Woll points out that there were significant differences between the govern-
ment bailouts that followed collective inaction in the United Kingdom and the
United States. When U.K. officials realized that the strongest banks would not
73 Woll, supra note 1, at 94–107.
74 Woll, supra note 1, at 171–72; see also Culpepper & Reinke, supra note 12, at 438–41, 447
(arguing that HSBC had significant operations abroad and could credibly threaten to move its
headquarters outside the United Kingdom if the government intervened too strongly).
Explaining Variations in Bailout Policies 21
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/9/16 3:53 PM
voluntarily contribute to a collective rescue program, the government adopted a
bailout scheme that contained much more onerous terms than those offered to
banks in the United States.75 In our view, this important difference in bailout
terms resulted from two factors related to political power that went beyond
considerations of institutional health. First, the U.K. financial industry retained
substantially less political clout after the bailouts compared to the U.S. financial
sector because the U.K. bailouts were substantially larger in relation to the size
of the U.K. economy. As a result, public anger against big banks in the United
Kingdom was significantly more intense than it was in the United States. In the
aftermath of the bailouts, public outrage greatly diminished the City of London’s
traditional influence over public policy in the United Kingdom, while Wall Street
was considerably more successful in obstructing financial reform efforts.76
Second, although both countries had a history of light-touch regulation with
repeated concessions to financial institutions, the political influence of the finan-
cial sector in the United States was particularly strong due to the sector’s massive
campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures, as well as the rapidly spin-
ning revolving door.77 For both reasons, we believe that the largest U.S. banks had
a significantly greater capacity to resist unfavorable government policies and,
therefore, had less reason to fear a government backlash when they did not join
government rescue programs. As Woll points out, the U.S. financial industry was
correct in believing that it could forgo collective action without incurring severe
government sanctions. Compared to the United Kingdom, the United States finan-
cial sector effectively received a “free bailout.”78
The foregoing comparison indicates that the most important source of the
financial industry’s ability to adopt a strategy of collective inaction is its political
clout (productive power). Although the health of leading banks, such as
JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Barclays, HSBC, and Standard Chartered, cer-
tainly played a role in supporting the collective inaction of the two financial
75 Woll, supra note 1, at 102–03.
76 Compare Kevin Crowley & Ambereen Choudhury, Made-in-London Scandals Risk City
Reputation as Money Center, Bloomberg (July 6, 2012); and Kevin Crowley & Ambereen
Choudhury, London Shrinks Faster Than Any Financial Center as Banks Come Under Attack,
Bloomberg (Jan. 17, 2012); with Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1296–1328.
77 Levitin, supra note 71, at 1237–49; Wilmarth, supra note 20, at 1363–1446; Gautami
Mukunda, The Price of Wall Street’s Power, Harv. Bus. Rev. 70, 72–73 (June 2014). For a skeptical
response to claims that U.S. financial regulatory policies indicate a high degree of capture by
the financial industry, see Philip Wallach, What Is Regulatory Capture?, The New Rambler: An
Online Review of Books (2015), available at http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/politi-
cal-science/what-is-regulatory-capture.
78 Woll, supra note 1, at 172–75.
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sectors, the financial health factor cannot fully explain why U.S. banks were
more successful than their U.K. peers in avoiding bailouts with onerous terms.
4.2.2 France and Germany
The banking sectors in France and Germany wielded similar structural power
due to both nations’ long history of bank-based economies. Traditionally both
nations adopted regulatory policies that were more interventionist than those of
the United States and the United Kingdom, and both nations offered fewer
opportunities for financial innovation. (However, as noted below, the stringency
of bank regulation in Germany weakened considerably during the 1990s and
2000s, as German authorities sought to enable their largest banks to compete
with U.S. and U.K. banks, and to promote Frankfurt as a rival to New York and
London.) Compared with the financial sectors of the United States and the
United Kingdom, the financial industry had a lower productive power in con-
tinental Europe, particularly in France.79
Despite the similarities in structural and productive power between the
French and German banking industries, the German bailout placed a much
greater strain on the public budget because large commercial banks refused to
support a collective rescue program. When sharp divisions between the different
segments of the German banking industry blocked collective action, “the gov-
ernment was left with no other options than to pick up the bill if it wanted to
avoid a complete collapse of its banking sector and possibly its entire econ-
omy.”80 Woll contends that the most important reason for collective inaction by
the German banking industry was that Deutsche Bank, the largest commercial
(universal) bank, was a healthy institution. Deutsche Bank would have been the
most important contributor to a collective rescue program, but Josef Ackerman
publicly expressed his opposition to a collective program and also declared that
Deutsche Bank did not need government support to withstand the crisis.81
In contrast, the French banking industry cooperated with the French gov-
ernment to organize a private-public rescue plan. Woll attributes this collective
action to the fact that there were only six important French banks,82 and all but
one of them needed some degree of public assistance. The only French bank that
clearly did not need government support was Crédit Mutuel, but that bank was
79 Id. at 114–15.
80 Id. at 137.
81 Id. at 131, 172.
82 Id. at 137.
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“one of the smallest French financial institutions” and therefore “had no clout in
the collective negotiations.”83
Woll is correct in pointing out that all of the largest French banks needed
public support, and they therefore felt obliged to accept collective plans for
liquidity provisions and recapitalization by the French government. Even so,
BNP Paribas was a comparatively strong bank, and it improved its financial
position after closing investment vehicles that had been exposed to the US
housing market. Nevertheless, BNP’s chairman, Michel Pébéreau, played a
central role in designing the French plan.84
Why were the leading financial institutions in France willing to work toward
a collective solution, while Deutsche Bank refused? In France, as Woll points
out, the financial sector exercised less productive power. Pre-crisis regulation
was relatively strict in France. By contrast, Germany adopted a more permissive
attitude toward the banking industry during the decade leading up to the
financial crisis. German officials applied lax accounting rules and allowed
German banks to engage in subprime lending and investment activities through
special purpose entities, in part because Germany wanted to promote a financial
sector and a financial center (Frankfurt) that could compete on equal terms with
their U.S. and U.K. counterparts.85 In addition, Deutsche Bank was by far the
largest and most important German bank and had extensive international opera-
tions (with only 27% of its income derived from Germany). Like HSBC, but unlike
the big French banks, Deutsche Bank had sufficient international standing and
enough political clout to refuse to cooperate with the German bank rescue
plan.86 Thus, Deutsche Bank’s greater political potency – including its ability
to shift operations from Germany to other countries – appears to have been an
important factor that may explain why Deutsche Bank (unlike the leading
French banks) could afford to play a game of “chicken”87 with its national
government.
4.2.3 Ireland and Denmark
Woll’s final pair of case studies addresses two small European countries with
“substantial financial development, a homegrown housing market bubble, and a
83 Id. at 172; see also Culpepper & Reinke, supra note 12, at 18–19.
84 Jabko & Massoc, supra note 61, at 562–85.
85 Woll, supra note 1, at 114, 128.
86 Culpepper & Reinke, supra note 12, at 438–41, 445–47.
87 Woll, supra note 1, at 3.
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great dependence on international wholesale markets for bank funding.”88 In
both Ireland and Denmark, the national economy had a high degree of structural
dependence on the financial industry due to the very large size of the industry in
proportion to GDP. Despite their similar economic settings, Ireland and Denmark
adopted bank support schemes that were strikingly different. The Irish govern-
ment incurred massive government liabilities in supporting its banking sector,
and those obligations eventually triggered a sovereign debt crisis. In contrast,
the Danish government orchestrated a public-private rescue scheme that was
supported by substantial contributions from the financial industry. The Danish
plan required the banking sector to contribute collectively by paying substantial
fees for guarantees and also by paying into a new fund that would cover losses
from bank failures. Denmark’s rescue program “effectively ring-fenced the
Danish financial industry and protected the public budget.”89
Woll addresses the question of why Danish banks were willing to act collec-
tively while Irish banks did not. Woll states that “Denmark might have looked
like Germany had Danske Bank been in good health. But [Danske Bank] was not,
to a point where some speculated that the Danish recapitalization was... just to
put into place a bail out for Danske Bank.” Thus, unlike Deutsche Bank, the
biggest Danish bank needed public help and therefore did not have any incentive
to “walk away from the table.”90 At the same time, all three major banks in
Ireland – Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish – desperately needed
help, but they still chose not to act collectively. According to Woll’s thesis, the
very weak condition of all three Irish banks should have caused them to act
collectively by joining the Irish government’s rescue plan for the banking
industry.
Once again, the very different responses of the Danish and Irish banks
appear to be directly tied to sharp disparities in their political clout. The
Danish government maintained a stricter regulatory scheme and could call
upon several policy instruments during the financial crisis. An important reason
for the Danish government’s strong control over Danish banks was that the
“memory of the [Scandinavian] financial crisis of the 1990s was still vivid in
the Nordic countries in the 2000s.”91 Bank resolution was an important public
concern, and the Danish government established a public guarantee fund in
1994 to provide for unwinding distressed financial institutions and protecting
depositors and investors. In 2007, after the European Union (EU) decided that
88 Id. at 139.
89 Id. at 140.
90 Id. at 172.
91 Grossman & Woll, supra note 16, at 11.
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the Danish public guarantee program violated EU state aid rules, Danish banks
collectively established an industry-funded plan (the Private Contingency
Association) to handle failures of distressed banks.92
In contrast, Ireland’s banking industry enjoyed ample productive power.
Irish banks expanded rapidly during the decade leading up to the financial crisis
and became extremely large compared to the Irish economy. Ireland’s bank
regulators adopted a lax approach that was similar to the United Kingdom’s
“principles-based” system with “light touch” oversight, due in part to Ireland’s
close economic links with the United Kingdom.93
Woll acknowledges that the productive power of the financial industry in
Demark “appears to be lower than in Ireland…. In Ireland, it was very high.”94
Therefore, it seems likely that the reasons for the willingness of Danish banks to
contribute to the Danish government’s rescue plan were similar to the reasons
why French banks adopted a cooperative response. In both Denmark and
France, the banks needed public support and also did not believe that they
had enough political influence to resist a collective response.
In contrast, the Irish banks enjoyed significant political clout due to their
rapidly expanding importance within the Irish economy as well as their strong
alliances with real estate developers, who exerted great influence over the Irish
government. Moreover, the Irish government was committed to an “extremely
light-touch financial regulatory regime” in order to achieve Ireland’s goal of
becoming a global center for attracting operations by “offshore” financial insti-
tutions.95 The largest Irish banks apparently felt quite confident that their
government would commit public funds for a generous bailout scheme that
would not require any contribution from the banks.96
92 Id.
93 Woll, supra note 1, at 141; see also James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr. & Ross Levine, Guardians of
Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us 123–30 (2012); Kenneth P.V. O’Sullivan & Stephen Kinsella,
Financial and regulatory failure: The case of Ireland, 14 J. Banking Reg. No. 1, at 1, 5–12 (2013).
94 Woll, supra note 1, at 143.
95 Gregory Connor, Thomas Flavin & Brian G. O’Kelly, The US and Irish Credit Crises: Their
Distinctive Differences and Common Features (Mar. 8, 2010), at 14–17, 20–21 available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1566844; see also Suzy Hansen, The Reckoning, Bloomberg Businessweek 83,
90 (Nov. 22–28, 2010) (explaining that “politicians, developers, regulators, and bankers” in
Ireland were “interdependent on each other,” and further noting that “Irish banks operated in a
culture of deference and uniformity.... Ireland had 10 to 15 major property developers who could
drive the market, and everyone wanted to loan money to them.”).
96 Connor, supra note 95, at 5, 20–21 (stating that “Irish domestic banks were blessed with
extremely generous bailout policies by the government,” and “[f]or the two largest Irish
domestic banks, there was probably some foresight that if their reckless actions during the
bubble period led them into trouble, the government would step in and save the institutions”).
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The confidence of the Irish banks proved to be well-placed. The Irish
government issued blanket guarantees that protected depositors and senior
bondholders in the Irish banks. The guarantees were so far-reaching that they
triggered a sovereign debt crisis. Ireland was ultimately forced to accept a
bailout of more than $110 billion from the EU, the European Central Bank
(ECB), and the IMF.97
During the past three years the Irish economy has gradually recovered from
its deep slump, and Irish banks have also revived, thanks in large part to the
open-ended bailouts they received. The Irish government placed Anglo-Irish
Bank into liquidation and prosecuted several of its senior executives. However,
the other leading Irish banks (including the two largest, Allied Irish Bank and
Bank of Ireland) survived the crisis after receiving government bailouts.98 The
banks’ political allies, large real estate developers, have also returned to promi-
nence as housing construction has resumed.99 This evidence suggests that the
surviving Irish banks may have retained a substantial portion of their productive
power despite Ireland’s financial crisis.
5 Conclusion
Professor Woll’s book argues persuasively that the financial sector’s willingness
or refusal to act collectively can be a decisive element in shaping bailout terms
and also in measuring the power that the financial sector wields over national
governments. However, we disagree with her view that the health of leading
97 Dara Doyle & Joe Brennan, Irish Tell Spain to Imagine Worst in Banking Bailout, Bloomberg
(June 14, 2012) (explaining how Ireland’s guarantees for its banks caused a sovereign debt
crisis); UPDATE 3-Ireland opts to exit bailout without back up credit line, Reuters (Nov. 14, 2013)
(discussing Ireland’s sovereign debt crisis and its bailout by the EU, ECB, and IMF).
98 Vincent Boland, Signs the Celtic Tiger is slowly prowling back, Fin. Times (Sept. 27, 2015);
Vincent Boland, Ex-Anglo Irish chief faces US court as Ireland seeks extradition, Fin. Times
(Oct. 11, 2015); Donal Griffin, Irish Bankers Vow This Time It’s Different After Bust: Mortgages,
Bloomberg (Feb. 28, 2014); see also Joe Brennan, Irish Bank Evicts Pensioner After $155 Billion
Losses: Mortgages, Bloomberg (April 25, 2012) (reporting that the Irish financial crisis resulted in
“the nationalization of five of the country’s biggest lenders” as well as the government’s
infusion of 62 billion euros of new capital into six Irish banks); Doyle & Brennan, supra note
97 (explaining that the Irish government also helped its banks by establishing the National
Asset Management Agency, which paid 32 billion euros to the banks and assumed “74 billion
euros of toxic real estate assets”).
99 Vincent Boland, Return of the Irish property developer, Fin. Times (Nov. 6, 2015); Griffin,
supra note 98.
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financial institutions is the most important factor in determining whether the
financial sector can resist a collective rescue plan. While institutional health is
certainly a significant factor, we believe that the productive power (political
clout) of the financial industry is even more important in affecting the industry’s
ability to refuse the government’s call for collective action. In the United States,
United Kingdom, Germany and Ireland, financial institutions avoided contribut-
ing to government rescue plans because of the political influence they wielded.
In the United States and Ireland, financial institutions received the most gener-
ous bailout terms because they possessed the highest levels of political influ-
ence among the six national industries analyzed in Professor Woll’s book.
We agree with Professor Woll that it is essential to understand the economic
and political circumstances that enable financial institutions to adopt a strategy
of collective inaction when a financial crisis occurs. However, we believe that
Professor Woll’s analysis understates the potential threat posed by the political
influence of systemically important financial institutions. Financial reform
efforts must emphasize the goal of diminishing the financial industry’s political
influence, because that influence presents the single greatest obstacle to the
adoption and implementation of government policies that would serve the
public interest rather than the industry’s preferences. Reform efforts should
seek to reduce the financial industry’s political clout by addressing problems
created by political contributions, lobbying, the revolving door, and excessively
concentrated industry structures.
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